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LIFESAVING LEGISLATION: BUT WILL THE
WASHINGTON STALKING LAW SURVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY?
Jennifer A. Hueter
Abstract: In 1992, the Washington Legislature responded to public demand for a law that
would allow criminal prosecution of stalkers by enacting Washington Revised Code section
9AA6.1 10. This stalking legislation makes it a crime to harass or repeatedly follow another
person. This law may infringe an individual's right to speak and move freely and, because the
law may unconstitutionally limit protected conduct, a defendant may successfully challenge
this statute's constitutionality in the future. This Comment examines the potential
constitutional challenges to the stalking law and suggests revisions to the current language in
the statute.

Kristin Lardner, a 21-year-old art student in Boston, met Michael
Cartier, a bouncer, at a bar.' They dated for five months before she broke
up with him? He beat her badly when she attempted to end the
relationship.3 Kristin obtained a restraining order against him.4 She was
unaware at that time that he had a rap sheet three pages long that
included convictions for robbery, abusing a former girlfriend, and killing
animals.5 Ultimately, Michael shot Kristin three times at point-blank
range on a busy Boston street and then killed himself shortly afterwards.6
Kristen's father, George Lardner, an investigative reporter for The
Washington Post, published an account of the brutal murder.7
Highly publicized incidents such as this illustrate the need for laws
that protect victims of stalking. The public has become more familiar
with the term "stalking" in recent years due in part to the media's
1. George Lardner, The Stalking of Kristin: A FatherInvestigates the MurderofHis Daughter 3,
70 (1995); see Brian Reilly, How a System Failed,Aiding a Young Girl's Murder, Wash. Times,
Feb. 4, 1996, at B7 ("Mr. Lardner... hammers out the ugly truth that happened to his loving,
creative and painfully innocent 21-year -old daughter.").
2. Lardner, supra note 1, at 23.
3. Id. at 12.
4. Id.at 23.
5. Id. at 33, 72, 85-89; see also Judy Mann, Victims ofLove, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1995, at C15.
6. Lardner, supra note 1, at 6, 9, 32; Reilly, supra note 1, at B7; Erika Taylor, In BriefNonfiction, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1996 (reviewing George Lardner, The Stalking ofKristin:A Father
Investigates the Murder ofHis Daughter(1995)). Taylor notes that Lardner "won a Pulitzer Prize for
writing the story of his daughter's tragic death."
7. See Lardner, supra note 1, at xi; Mann, supra note 5, at C15; Reilly, supra note 1, at B7
(describing Mr. Lardner's book as "an account of his daughter's murder and a diatribe against the
system that let it happen... ").
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increased documentation of victims who turned to a legal system that
failed them.'
Nationwide, lawmakers have attempted to address this widespread
problem by enacting stalking laws that criminalize threatening or
harassing behavior. 9 Many of these laws have been challenged on
constitutional grounds." Stalking laws that are struck down because of
hasty enactment and poor drafting obviously fail to achieve the objective
of protecting victims such as Kristin.
The Washington Legislature enacted a stalking law in 1992.
Washington's law will likely be challenged as unconstitutional by future
criminal defendants. This Comment explores the constitutional
implications of stalking laws and examines the Washington statute for
constitutional infirmities. Part I describes the development of stalking as
an increasing social problem and documents the historical impetus to
enact stalking laws nationwide and in Washington. Part II analyzes the
Washington legislation and its specific provisions. Part III provides an
overview of the potential constitutional challenges and describes the
analysis a Washington court would likely apply. Part IV concludes that
revisions to the Washington stalking law, such as the nclusion of a
credible threat requirement and exemptions for constitutionally protected

8. Lardner, supranote 1, at 33-35.
9. See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie Supp.
1995); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (West Supp. 1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312A (1995); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-90 to -93 (1996); Idaho Code § 187905 (Supp. 1996); Ind. Code Ann. ch. 35-45-10 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 213438 (Supp. 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 750.41 lh-.41 1i (West Supp. 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (West Supp. 1997); Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1996); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.225 (West Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 455-220 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 200.571-.601 (Michie 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3a
(1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 12-10 (West 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1995);
Okla. Stat. Ann. fit. 21, § 1173 (vest Supp. 1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709 (West Supp.
1996); RI. Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-1700 to 1840 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19A-1 to -7 (Supp. 1996); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 42.071 (West Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1995 & Supp. 1996);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 1061-1063 (Supp. 1996); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.110 (1996); W. Va.
Code § 61-2-9a (1992 & Supp. 1996); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1996).
10. See, e.g., People v. McClelland, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1996); State v. C'almo, 642 A.2d 90
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1993); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1995); Johnson v. State, 449 S.E.2d
94 (Ga. 1994); People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953 (IlI. 1995); Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995); People v. White, 536 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. App. 1995); State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14
(Mont. 1995); Commonwealth v. Schierscher, 668 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); State v. Fonseca,
670 A.2d 1237 (R.I. 1996); State v. McGill, 536 N.W.2d 89 (S.D. 195); Woolfolk v.
Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530 (Va. Ct.App. 1994); Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953 (Wyo. 1996).
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activities, are necessary to improve the likelihood that it will withstand
judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.
I.

STALKING: A PERVASIVE SOCIETAL PROBLEM

A.

The Backdrop Nationwide

"Stalking" is a term that was popularized recently by its addition to
the statutory lexicon, but the harassing behavior it describes is not a new
phenomenon. Prior to 1990, the law generally offered no redress for
victims of stalking." Domestic violence experts, law enforcement
officers, and the victims of stalking were well aware of this inadequacy
in the law. 2
Reports of celebrity stalking first commanded the attention of the
American public. 3 Recently, the conviction of Madonna's stalker again
focused the media on this problem. 4 Allegations that O.J. Simpson
stalked his former wife also acted as an impetus for domestic violence
groups to speak out about the problems of stalking. 5 Celebrities are not
the only victims of stalking. One study concludes that fifty-one percent
of stalking victims are ordinary citizens. 6 Of the other victims, seventeen
percent are highly recognizable
celebrities and thirty-two percent are
7
celebrities.'
known
lesser
Victims report being harassed, threatened, or followed in a variety of
situations. Stalking is a gender-neutral crime, although the most
commonly documented stalking incidents arise after a woman ends a

11. James C. Wickens, Comment, Michigan's New Anti-Stalking Laws: Good Intentions Gone
Awry, 1994 Det. C.L. Rev. 157, 158 (1994).
12. Id. at 161.
13. Heather M. Steams, Comment, Stalking Stuffers: A Revolutionary Law to Keep Predators
Behind Bars, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1027, 1027 (1995). The murder of the actress, Rebecca
Schaeffer, acted as an impetus for the California Legislature to enact its stalking law. Id.
14. People in the News, Agence France Presse, Jan. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3785525
(reporting conviction of Robert Dewey Hoskins for stalking Madonna).
15. Nicole Hit Me, Simpson Says, Calgary Herald, Feb. 8, 1996, at AS (reporting advocate for
battered women Carolann Peterson's descriptions of Simpson's behavior as typical of "having been a
batterer and a stalker"); Simpson Scoffs at Claims He Stalked Ex-Wife, Seattle Times, Feb. 6, 1996,
atA2.
16. Wickens, supranote 11, at 162 & n.25 (citing Hearingson S. 719 Before the Michigan House
JudiciaryComm., 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (May 5, 1992) (statement of Mich. State Sen. Geake)).
17. Id.
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relationship and is then harassed by her former boyfriend or spouse. 8
Nearly one-third of all women murdered annually die at the hands of a
lover. 9 As many as ninety percent of women killed by their former
partners have been stalked prior to their murder.2" Furthermore, in many
rape and assault cases, the victim sees the attacker repeatedly before the
crime is committed. 2
Experts suggest that stalking is a pervasive problem.' Psychiatrists
estimate that five percent of women in the United States will be victims
of unwanted pursuit at some time in their lives.' In at least seventy to
eighty percent of reported stalking cases, the victim knows the stalker,
whereas in approximately twenty percent of reported cases, the stalker is
a stranger.24 A major psychiatric study estimates that there are 200,000
people in the United States who are stalking someone.'

Prior to 1990, most stalking behavior was not punishable. 26 Stalking
behavior encompasses a wide range of activities, including threatening or
repeatedly following someone, electronic surveillance of another, writing

unsolicited letters and notes, and persistently calling or electronically
contacting a victim. 27 Although every state prohibited threatening or
obscene telephone calls, few imposed penalties for other stalking

18. Melinda Beck, Murderous Obsession, Newsweek, July 7, 1992, at 60, 60-61. Although some
men have reported being stalked and some stalkers are strangers to their victims, the majority of
cases are reported by women who are being stalked by an ex-boyfriend or ex-husband. Id.
19. 3. William David, Comment, Is Pennsylvania's Stalking Law Constitutional?,56 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 205,208 (1994).
20. Beck, supra note 18, at 60-61.
21. Cheryl Laird, Stalking: Lavs Confront Obsession That Turns Fear Into Terror and Brings
Nightmares To Life, Houston Chron., May 17, 1992, at 1.
22. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terrorof Stalking: But Some Experts Say Measures
are Vague, USA Today, July 21, 1992, at 9A.
23. Id.
24. Tamar Lewin, New Laws Address Old Problem: The Terror of a Stalker's Threats, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1993, at Al.
25. Puente, supra note 22, at 9A.
26. In 1984, only three states, Arkansas, Colorado, and New York, had statutes that broadly
criminalized forms of harassment. Andrea J. Robinson, Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment,
70 Va. L. Rev. 507, 523 n.77 (1984).
27. See, e.g., Richard Seven, Terror and Taps: Ex-Boyfriend Held in Stalking; Home Bugged,
Broken Into; Woman Moves From Area, Seattle Times, Dec. 23, 1994, at BI; see also Gene Barton,
Comment, Taking a Byte Out of Crime: E-Mail Harassment and the Inefficacy of Existing Law, 70
Wash. L. Rev. 465, 467-68 (1995) (describing e-mail stalking, such as flaming and letter mail
bombing, as communications designed to harass another person); David, supra note 16, at 208;
Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The Natureand Constitutionality ofStalking Laws, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 991,
994 & nn.23-25 (1993).
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behaviors, such as following or threatening an individual. 28 Thus, law
enforcement officers could only advise complaining victims of other
types of harassment to seek a restraining order. Officers could not arrest
a threatening individual, even if the perpetrator followed and harassed a
victim for years, unless a physical act was committed against the victim
or the victim's property. Critics noted the widespread inefficacy of a
restraining order to actually stop a violent attack or murder of a victim of
stalking29 and this inefficacy led some to refer to the lack of legislation as
a "life-threatening hole in the law."30
B.

National Response

California enacted the first stalking legislation in the nation in
response to public outcry after the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca
Schaeffer and the 1990 murders of four Orange County women in a five
week period.3" These women had reported stalking behavior by their
attackers and obtained restraining orders against their eventual
murderers.3 2
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia followed the example
set by California and quickly passed stalking, or "anti-stalking,"
legislation.3 3 The haste with which states enacted these laws prompted
many experts to criticize such legislation as vague, overbroad, and in
some cases, unconstitutional as applied to a case where activities are
arguably constitutionally protected.3 4

28. David, supranote 19, at 208.
29. Lewin, supra note 24, at Al, A12 ("The police would get a call saying the guy's coming over,
even though there's a restraining order, and they'd tell the woman there's nothing they can do until
he gets there. And then the next call they'd get is the neighbor saying, 'He shot her."') (quoting
David Beatty, Director of Public Policy, National Victim Center, Wash. D.C.); Mann, supra note 5,

at C15.
30. Stalking the Stalkers, USA Today, Feb. 26, 1992, at 10A.
31. Miles Convin, hen The Law Can't Protect,L.A. Times, May 8, 1993, at IA.
32. Steams, supra note 13, at 1027.
33. Harvey Wallace, Stalkers, The Constitution, and Victims'Remedies, Crim. Just., Spring 1995,
at 16, 16. Only two states, Arizona and Maine, have not enacted stalking laws, but these two states
prosecute stalking behavior under broader harassment statutes that protect a victim from being

harassed or terrorized. Id.
34. Puente, supra note 22, at 9A.
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The Backdrop in Washington

Stalking laws in many states addressed the increasing local concern
about the inability of law enforcement officers to arrest individuals who
threatened their victims prior to an overt criminal act.35 In Washington,
citizens echoed the national call for laws to criminalize stalking.36
Immediately preceding the enactment of the law in 1992, the Washington
media focused on two local issues that both indicated the need for new,
tougher laws to combat threatening behavior.
The first major issue to draw public attention was an increase in
sexual harassment lawsuits.37 Many sexual harassment claims reported in
the local media in 1992 involved allegations of repeated acts of
intimidation over a period of time.3" The second controversial issue to
rise to the forefront of public concern involved threatening behavior
against racial minorities.39 The newspapers documented the terror felt by
minorities who experienced cross burnings, harassing telephone calls,
and other threats designed to intimidate and cause fear.4" Existing
harassment laws failed to adequately protect victims who were
threatened with violence because they required an overt act for
conviction.
D.

Washington 's Response

Substitute House Bill 2702, the stalking bill, received broad public
support when it was introduced to the House of Representatives by
35. Id.
36. Editorial, Stalking Women: Law Needs DeterrenceBefore It's Too Late, Seattle Times, Feb.
10, 1992, atA8.
37. See, e.g., Jill Leovy, Kent Official Battles HarassmentLawsuit, Seattle Times, Feb. 14, 1992,
at F2; Peter Lewis, Savant Labels Boeing Plant a Haven For Harassment, Seattle Times, Feb. 8,
1992, at A6; Robert T. Nelson, A Lose-Lose HarassmentCase, Seattle Times, Jan. 27, 1992, at El.
38. Peter Lewis, 'The Men Got Nasty,' Stapp Testifies; Harassment at Boeing Worsened After
Complaint, Ex-Worker Says, Seattle Times, Feb. 12, 1992, at B1; Jim Simon & Barbara Serrano,
Accuser Wanted Johnson Out: GOP Senator Steps Down Amidst Harassment Charges, Seattle
Times, Jan. 23, 1992, at B1.
39. See, e.g., Stephen Clutter, Justice Slow, Uncertain For Man Claiming Harassment, Seattle
Times, Feb. 10, 1992, at B1; Nancy Montgomery, Cross-BurningPuzzles, Anger: Bellevue Officials,
Seattle Times, Jan. 31, 1992, at BI; PoliceHave No Leads in Recent Cross-Burning,Seattle Times,
Feb. 4, 1992, atB3.
40. See, e.g., Diane Brooks, As Snohomish County Grows, So May Racial Incidents, Seattle
Times, Feb. 12, 1992, at A6; Stephen Clutter, 2 Guilty in MischiefAgainst Black Family, Seattle
Times, Feb. 25, 1992, at C2; Blake DeYoung, Letter, 'The Color ofFear' Stop IgnoringReality of
Racism, Seattle Times, Feb. 16, 1992, at A19.
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Representative Robert Johnson, Mount Vernon, in February, 1992.41
Groups calling for legislative action to address the problem of stalking
included the Washington Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs and
Washington Association of Police Chiefs.42 An editorial supporting the
bill described its enactment as a necessary measure.43 Amid public
pressure to address the problem quickly, the Washington Legislature
hastily enacted the law without adequate consideration of its
constitutionality.'
1.

Legislative History

The legislative history of the Washington stalking law reveals the
speed with which it was enacted. Substitute House Bill 2702 was
introduced on February 7, 1992, and passed by unanimous vote on
February 17, 1992. 4" The Senate first read the Engrossed Substitute
House Bill 2702 on February 19, 1992.4" The bill passed unanimously on
March 3, 1992, and was signed by the Governor less than one month
later.47 The entire process took only eight weeks.
The Legislature amended the bill only slightly before enacting it into
law. The House of Representatives voted to include an increased penalty
if the stalker had been previously convicted of harassment or had
violated a court order.48 The Senate amended the bill to include a defense
to the crime of stalking if the defendant is a licensed private detective
acting within the capacity of his or her license.49
The Legislature passed the bill with minimal discussion about the
constitutionality of the measure. Just prior to its enactment, Senator
Talmadge asked a proponent of the bill, Senator Nelson, during a Point
41. Wash. House J. at 1174-77 (1992) (originally sponsored by Representatives R. Johnson,
Belcher, Paris, Schmidt, Anderson, Roland, Bray, Jacobsen, Spanel, Scott, Leonard, Sheldon,
Wynne, Lisk, Ebersole, Brough, Basich, R. King, Valle, Zellinsky, Kremen, Hochstatter, Wineberry,
Winsley, Van Luven, Forner, P. Johnson, Bowman, Pruitt, Fraser, Tate, Ogden, J. Kohl, McLean,
Wood, and Rasmussen).
42. Stalling Women, supranote 36, at A-8.
43. Id.
44. One Senator, Phillip Talmadge, questioned the constitutionality of the stalking bill. Wash.
Sen. J. at 838 (1992). Notably, this Senator is currently a Justice sitting on the Washington Supreme
Court.
45. Wash. House J., supra note 41, at 1174-77.
46. Wash. Sen. J., supra note 44, at 838.
47. Wash. Legis. Dig. at 709-10 (1992).
48. Wash. House J., supranote 41, at 1176.
49. Wash. Sen. J., supra note 44, at 837.
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of Inquiry, whether the provisions of the bill would "pass constitutional
of the requirement for statutes to punish a specific or
muster" in light
"overt" act."0 The issue raised by Senator Talmadge focused on whether
this statute could survive a challenge of vagueness or overbreadth.
Senator Nelson responded that conviction depended on the victim's
subjective feeling of fear or intimidation, but the Senator failed to
indicate how this law might affect constitutionally protected activity."
The Senate debate also raised questions about increasing the penalty
for repeat offenders. 2 A proponent of the bill clarified the circumstances
under which an increased penalty applied, indicating the inclusion of
situations in which the perpetrator violates a protective order or court
order. 3 The bill also mandates a higher penalty if a perpetrator with a
prior stalking conviction harasses a victim.54 Under these circumstances,
the defendant is guilty of a class C felony.5
The Legislature amended the statute in 199456 to broaden the
circumstances under which a defendant could be convicted. 7 The
original version of the statute was amended to require that a stalker either
"intentionally and repeatedly" harass or "repeatedly follow" another
person to be convicted of the crime of stalking. The effect of the
amendments was to add "intentionally and repeatedly harassing" to the
list of stalking behavior. The original language prohibited the intentional
and repeated following of another person to that person's home, school,
place of employment, business, or "any other location." 9 The statute
further prohibited following another person "while the person is in transit
between locations."' During the 1994 session, the Legislature amended
that provision to state that it is not necessary to establish that the alleged
stalker follows the person "while in transit from one location to

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 838.
Id.
Id. (statement of Sen. Haynor).
Id. (statement of Sen. Nelson).

54. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.110(5)(c) (1996).
55. § 9A.46.110(5).
56. Act of Apr. 1, 1994, ch. 271, § 801, 1994 Wash. Laws 1719 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9A.46.110 (1996)).
text of the amended stalking law, see infra note 71.
57. § 801. For the fill

58. § 801.
59. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.110(1)(a) (1982), amendedby § 801.
60. § 9A.46.110(1)(a) (1982), amended by § 801.
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another."61 The amended statute applies to a expanded range of activities
because it now criminalizes both harassing and following. 2
2.

Implementation

Judges in Washington have imposed criminal sentences on stalkers
since the enactment of the law, and highly publicized cases continue to
bring the crime of stalking to the forefront of public attention.63 For
example, a Seattle woman dated William Carey, a Bellevue resident and
Microsoft employee, for two years. ' When she broke up with him, Carey
reacted violently, causing her to obtain a no-contact order and request an
unlisted telephone number. 5 Carey, however, installed electronic
surveillance equipment in her home, followed her to a local shopping
mall, robbed her 6home, and, finally, broke into her house while she was
taking a shower.
Seattle Police searched Carey's car and found burglary tools, a
crossbow, two assault rifles, and bullets. In his home, police discovered
surgical gloves, receipts from a local surveillance store, and notes that
appeared to be handwritten transcriptions of the woman's telephone
conversations.67 A King County judge sentenced Carey to twenty-six
months in prison in April, 1995, for felony stalking, burglary, and
cocaine possession."
The appropriateness of the law in situations like this is undisputed.
Carey committed illegal acts throughout his stalking of the victim. He
tapped her phone, committed burglary, and was armed with deadly
weapons. His actions indicate that he intended his victim to be frightened
and that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would have
experienced fear. His conduct clearly falls outside the scope of

61. § 801.
62. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.1 10 (1996).
63. See, e.g., Richard Seven, Stalker-Murderer Sentenced to Spend Rest of Life Behind Bars,
Seattle Times, Nov. 11, 1994, at B3; see also Man Pleads Guilty in Stalking of Wife, Seattle Times,
Oct. 13, 1995, at B2; Peyton Whitely et al., Shoreline Warned of'Sexual Psychopath":Slain Women
May Have Been Stalked as They Did TheirLaundry Late At Night, Seattle Times, Mar. 29, 1995, at
Al; Wayne Wurzer & Dianne Brooks, Man Likely to be Charged with Stalking Boy, 11, Seattle
Times, Oct. 21, 1994, atB3.
64. StalkerMay Get 2-Year Term, Seattle Times, Mar. 18, 1995, at AS.
65. Seven, supranote 27, at BI.

66. Id,
67. Id.
68. Stalker Sentenced To Prison, Seattle Times, Apr. 15, 1995, at A5.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 72:213, 1997

constitutional protection. Situations arise, however, that are not as clearcut. For example, the Washington statute may allow prosecution for
behavior such as leaving love letters for a former partner or attempting to
talk with a spouse when that person has indicated his or her nonconsent.6 9 The subjective feelings of the victim, measured by a standard
of reasonableness, may define stalking behavior in closer situations."0 An
examination of the specific provisions of the statute highlights the
behavior that is punishable under the Washington law.
II.

PROVISIONS OF THE WASHINGTON LAW

A.

Elements of the Crime

The stalking statute is codified at Washington Revised Code section
9A.46.110. 7' The basic elements of the crime are: (1) that a person acts
69. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.1 10(1)(b) (1996).
70. § 9A.46.110(1)(b). For example, whether communication by a former spouse constitutes
stalking may depend on how the communication is perceived by the other spouse. Thus, this
subjective perception will often be the dividing line separating criminal and non-criminal acts. It still
must be proven, however, that an alleged stalker intended to harass or repeatedly followed the person
and the subjective feelings of the person will be measured by what a reasonable person would have
felt in the situation. However, it should be noted that the element of "repeated following" of an
another person is satisfied if the defendant appears twice in any location in which visual or physical
proximity is deliberately maintained. Thus, if a former spouse appears at the family home twice in an
effort to reconcile with his or her partner, this constitutes "repeated following." § 9A.46.1 10 (1)(a),
(1)(b), (6)(d) (1996).
71. § 9A.46.1 10 provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of stalking if, without lawful authority and under circumstances
not amounting to a felony attempt of another crime: (a) He or she intentionally and repeatedly
harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and (b) The person being harassed or followed is
placed in fear that the stalker intends to injure the person, another person, or property of the
person or of another person. The feeling of fear must be one that a reasonable person in the same
situation would experience under all the circumstances; and (c) The stalker either. (i) Intends to
frighten, intimidate, or harass the person; or (ii) Knows or reasonably should know that the
person is afraid, intimidated, or harassed even if the stalker did not intend to place the person in
fear or intimidate or harass the person. (2)(a) It is not a defense to the crime of stalking under
subsection (1)(c)(i) of this section that the stalker was not given actual notice that the person did
not want the stalker to contact or follow the person; and (b) did not intend to frighten,
intimidate, or harass the person. (3) It shall be a defense to the crime of stalking that the
defendant is a licensed private detective acting within the capacity of his or her license as
provided by chapter 18.165 RCW. (4) Attempts to contact or follow the person after being given
actual notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed constitutes prima facie
evidence that the stalker intends to intimidate or harass the person. (5) A person who stalks
another person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor except that the person is guilty of a class C
felony if any of the following applies: (a) The stalker has previously been convicted in this state
or any other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim
or members of the victim's family or household or any person specifically named in a protective
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without lawful authority; (2) that a person intentionally and repeatedly
harasses or repeatedly follows another person; (3) the person being
harassed or followed experiences subjective fear; (4) the feeling of fear is
one that a reasonable person in the same situation would experience
under all the circumstances; and (5) the stalker either intends to frighten,
intimidate, or harass, or knows or reasonably should know that the
person is afraid, intimidated, or harassed even if the stalker did not intend
this response."
Intent can be inferred if a victim of stalking gives actual notice to a
defendant that he or she did not want to be contacted or followed. Actual
notice constitutes prima facie evidence that the stalker possessed the
requisite intent to intimidate or harass the other person.73 Thus, if the
victim proves that the defendant was notified that further contact was
undesired, the victim need not prove that the defendant possessed the
requisite intent to cause the victim fear or anxiety. 4 The statute also
provides that it is not a defense to a charge of stalking that the victim
failed to give actual notice to the alleged stalker that the perpetrator
should refrain from contacting or following the person. 75 Thus, an
individual attempting to contact another person could be charged with
this crime even if he or she did not know that the other person objected
to the attempted communication.

order, (b) the stalking violates any protective order protecting the person being stalked; (c) the
stalker has previously been convicted of a gross misdemeanor or felony stalking offense under
this section for stalking another person; (d) the stalker was armed with a deadly weapon, as
defined in RCW 9.94A.125, while stalking the person; (e) the stalker's victim is or was a law
enforcement officer, judge, juror, attorney, victim advocate, legislator, or community
correction's officer, and the stalker stalked the victim to retaliate against the victim for an act the
victim performed during the course of official duties or to influence the victim's performance of
official duties; or (f) the stalker's victim is a current, former, or prospective witness in an
adjudicative proceeding, and the stalker stalked the victim to retaliate against the victim as a
result of the victim's testimony or potential testimony. (6) As used in this section: (a) "Follows"
means deliberately maintaining visual or physical proximity to a specific person over a period of
time. A finding that the alleged stalker repeatedly and deliberately appears at the person's home,
school, place of employment, business, or any other location to maintain visual or physical
proximity to the person is sufficient to find that the alleged stalker follows the person. It is not
necessary to establish that the alleged stalker follows the person while in transit from one
location to another. (b) "Harasses" means unlawful harassment as defined in RCW 10.14.020.
(c) "Protective order" means any temporary or permanent court order prohibiting or limiting
violence against, harassment of, contact or communication with, or physical proximity to
another person. (d) "Repeatedly" means on two or more separate occasions.
72. § 9A.46.1 10(1)(a), (l)(b), (1)(c).
73. § 9A.46.110(4).
74. § 9A.46.110(4).
75. § 9A.46.110(2)(a).
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A defendant accused of stalking may not raise as a defense his or her
lack of intent to frighten, intimidate, or harass another person.76 The
statute states that the subjective intent of the defendant shall not be a
defense to the crime."
There is one exception to the intentional behavior prohibited by the
statute. The Washington Senate amended the statute during the 1992
session to include a defense for a licensed private detective acting within
the capacity of his or her license. 78 Apparently, the Senate acted out of
concern that professional detectives would be severely limited in
tracking leads if they could not "repeatedly follow" another person.
B.

IncreasedPenalties

The crime of stalking is a gross misdemeanor, but a defendant may be
convicted of class C felony stalking under certain circumstances. The
statute delineates six situations under which defendants will be guilty of
a felony if they are convicted of stalking.79
First, the penalty for stalking is increased if the stalker previously has
been convicted of any crime of harassment in Washington or any other
state. To be punished more severely, the defendant must have harassed
either the same victim, members of the victim's family or household, or
any person specifically named in a protective order. Second, the stalker
commits a felony if he or she violates any protective order of the person
being stalked in the charge being brought. Third, the statute provides for
increased punishment if the stalker has previously been convicted of any
stalking offense. Fourth, the penalty is increased if the offender was
armed with a deadly weapon at any time during the stalking of the
victim. Fifth, the defendant is guilty of a felony if the victim is or was a
law enforcement officer, judge, juror, attorney, victim advocate,
legislator, or community corrections officer, and if the stalker acted in
retaliation for an act the victim performed during the course of official
duties or to influence the victim's performance of official duties. Finally,
the stalker is subject to increased punishment if the victim is a current or
former witness in an adjudicative proceeding, and the stalker acted to

76. § 9A.46.110(2)(b).
77. § 9A.46.110(2)(b).
78. § 9A.46.110 (3); Wash. Sen. ., supranote 44, at 837-38 (on motion of Sen. Nelson).
79. § 9AA6.110(5).
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retaliate against the victim for testifying or in advance of potential
testimony."
These provisions of the statute offer increased protection for victims
who are in danger of retaliation. The concern that these situations
implicate constitutionally protected activities, such as free speech, is
slight."' A constitutional challenge based on retaliation would have less
likelihood of success than a challenge where the defendant was charged
with misdemeanor stalking based on attempting to communicate with a
former spouse or lover. Where a defendant plotted retaliation or acted in

violation of a known protective order, the stalker's intent may be less
disputed."
III. OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Stalking laws, which may penalize a defendant's conduct or speech,
have been challenged as both vague and overbroad." Without question,
stalking laws impact a defendant's right to speak and act freely."4
Challenges for vagueness arise when a statute does not state clearly
enough what behavior is prohibited." Overbreadth challenges arise when
a statute prohibits constitutionally protected behavior in additional to
culpable behavior.8 6 Finally, the constitutional right to travel may be

80. § 9A.46.110(5).
81. Cf State v. Talley, 122 Wash. 2d 192, 858 P.2d 217 (1993). In Talley, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld part of the Washington hate crimes statute and partially invalidated the law.
The court held that section 1 of the statute withstands constitutional scrutiny because it is aimed at
criminal conduct and only incidentally affects speech. The court, in striking down section 2 for
overbreadth, explained that the law inhibited free speech on the basis of its content. The court found
that section 2 made content distinctions within the fighting words category, and thus drew
impermissible distinctions based on content. Id. In a potential challenge to the stalking law, a
defendant might challenge the statute after being charged with retaliating against a law enforcement
officer or a judge. The challenge would be premised on the claim that the law impermissibly
regulates both unprotected conduct, and reaches protected conduct, such as exercising the right to
speak to one's spouse in the volatile setting of personal relationships.
82. But see State v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 900 P.2d 509
(1995) (affirming ruling that Oregon statute was unconstitutional where defendants violated
protective orders).
83. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 82 Wash. App. 298, 917 P.2d 159 (1996); Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953,
954 (Wyo. 1996); see also Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1995).
84. See Bouters, 659 So. 2d at 237-38.
85. Wickens, supra note 11, at 193.
86. Id. at 196. Vagueness and overbreadth challenges are frequently analyzed together because a
vague statute that inhibits First Amendment freedoms may also be overbroad. Id.
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implicated by stalking statutes' restrictions on defendants' movements.87
The Washington stalking law may be challenged under these doctrines
because it regulates speech, expressive conduct, and behavior.
A.

Voidfor Vagueness Doctrine

Although most state courts have upheld their stalking laws against
vagueness challenges,88 three courts declared their statutes facially
unconstitutional due to vagueness."
The void for vagueness analysis is based on a due process requirement
that a criminal statute convey a sufficiently definite warning of the
conduct prohibited when measured by common understanding and
practice.9" Vagueness challenges thus are premised on the due process
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A court must
consider two factors when examining a statute for vagueness: (1)
whether the statute either requires or forbids the doing of an act in
undefined terms such that persons of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; and (2)
whether the statute adequately guards against arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 9' The concerns reflected in this two-part test
are whether individuals are given "fair notice" that their conduct is
87. Although the right to travel is constitutionally protected, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), no court has struck down a state stalking law on this ground. A defendant challenged the
Connecticut stalking law, alleging that it impermissibly infringed his right to travel, but the court
found that the state has a sufficiently compelling interest in restricting the movement of its citizens
when the protection of individuals from stalking is at issue. State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1993). Similarly, a challenge to the Washington stalking law based on the right to travel
would likely be unsuccessful because it restricts only the right to follow anDther person when it
causes the victim to reasonably fear for his or her safety. See State v. Lee, 82 Wash. App. 298, 307,
917 P.2d 159, 165 (1996) (rejecting right-to-travel challenge to Washington stalking law); See also
text of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.1 10, supranote 71.
88. See, e.g., People v. McClelland, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1996); Culmo, 642 A.2d 90; Bouters,
659 So. 2d 235; Johnson v. State, 449 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. 1994); People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953 (Ill.
1995); Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); People v. White, 536 N.W.2d 876
(Mich. App. 1995); State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14 (Mont. 1995); Commonwealth v. Schierscher, 668
A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct 1995); State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I. 1996); State v.McGill, 536
N.W.2d 89 (S.D. 1995); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Vit,
909
P.2d 953.
89. See State v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 900 P.2d 509
(1995); Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 637 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1994); State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d
212,214 (Kan. 1996).
90. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); see also State v. Carver, 113
Wash. 2d 591, 597, 781 P.2d 1308, 1311 (1989) (adopting same analysis in examining Washington
statute for vagueness).
91. Grayned,408 U.S. at 108-09.
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forbidden and whether the law "encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests
and convictions."'92
Two rationales have been advanced to support this doctrine. The first
rationale is that a state should provide fair warning to ordinary citizens so
behavior may comport with the dictates of the statute. Second, a state
should preclude arbitrary, capricious, and generally discriminatory
enforcement by avoiding statutory language that gives officials too much
authority while providing too few constraints.93
The U.S. Constitution demands clarity in laws that threaten to impinge
constitutionally protected conduct.94 The Washington Supreme Court
held that if First Amendment speech freedoms are involved, the court
will consider whether a statute is facially unconstitutional. If a law does
not implicate freedom of speech, the court will usually only consider
whether it is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a specific case. 95
The court will consider a facial challenge even where freedom of speech
is not at issue if a defendant shows the following: (1) the statute
criminalizes behavior that would not normally be considered criminal
with no requirement of mens rea; (2) the statute invites an inordinate
amount of police discretion; or (3) the statute's vagueness is egregious. 96
Long-standing rules guide a court in analyzing a vagueness challenge
to the stalking law. A well-established principle is that the
constitutionality of a statute is presumed. 97 The challenging party has the
burden to establish the statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable
doubt. 98 Even though a law must provide ascertainable standards of guilt,
it is not considered vague merely because a person cannot predict with
complete certainty the exact point at which his or her conduct would be
prohibited. 99 Moreover, courts have held that an intent element of a
statute may provide a sufficient limit to police discretion."' Finally, a
court must view a statute as a whole to determine if it has the required
92. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
93. State v. Tanner, 472 N.E.2d 689, 691 (Ohio 1984).
94. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
95. State v. Carver, 113 Wash. 2d at 599, 781 P.2d at 1312 (1989); see also In re Dependency of
C.B., 79 Wash. App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171, 1173 (1995), review denied, 128 Wash. 2d 1023, 913
P.2d 816 (1996).
96. Carver,113 Wash. 2d at 599 n.2, 781 P.2d at 1312 n.2.
97. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901).
98. In re C.B., 79 Wash. App. at 689, 904 P.2d at 1173.
99. State v. Myles, 127 Wash. 2d 807, 812,903 P.2d 979,982 (1995).
100. Id. at 814, 903 P.2d at 983.
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degree of specificity rather than analyzing only portions of the statute in
isolation.'l"
1.

U.S. Supreme Court'sApplication of the Vagueness Doctrine

The U.S. Supreme Court has considered vagueness challenges to
many statutes. 2 In Coates v. City of Cincinnati,"3 the Court examined a
Cincinnati municipal ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct to
determine whether it was unconstitutionally vague. The ordinance
prohibited three or more persons from assembling on public property and
conducting themselves in a manner "annoying" to other persons.'0 4 The
Court struck down the statute, finding that it was impermissibly vague'
because it failed to specify any standard of conduct.0 6 The Court noted
that "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others."'0 7 The
statute was facially unconstitutional because the prohibited conduct was
not sufficiently defined.
2.

Washington Supreme Court'sApplication of the Vagueness
Doctrine

The Washington Supreme Court demands specificity with regard to
legislative language that criminalizes otherwise constitutionally protected
conduct. In City of Bellevue v. Miller,' the court held that the terms
"unlawful purpose" and "alarm" in a vagrancy statute defined illegality
in inherently subjective terms and that the statute was, thus, facially
unconstitutional.0 9 The statute prohibited wandering or prowling that
manifested an "unlawful purpose" or that warranted "alarm for the safety

101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 612 n.1 (1971).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 616.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at614.
Id.
85 Wash. 2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975).
Id. at 543 n.2, 536 P.2d at 606 n.2. The municipal ordinance stated in relevant part:

Among circumstances which may be considered as manifesting an unlawful purpose or
property, for purposes of this section, is flight by a person upon the appearance of a police
officer, the refusal of a person to identify himself to a police officer, or an attempt by a person to
conceal himself or any object from a police officer.
Id.
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of persons or property in the vicinity."" Although the ordinance listed
examples of prohibited conduct, this did not save the statute because the
list was not intended to be exclusive."' The ordinance did not place any
actual limitations on the exercise of police discretion
and the reach of the
12
indeterminate."'
and
"unbounded
was
ordinance
The Washington Supreme Court has not yet examined the
constitutionality of the stalking law. Such an examination would likely
focus in part on the use of the term "harasses." The Washington statute
defines harassing conduct as that which "seriously alarms, annoys,
harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate
or lawful purpose."".3 The stalking law may not possess the requisite
specificity to pass constitutional muster under the standards enunciated
by the state's highest court.
3.

Washington Court ofAppeals 'Application of the Vagueness
Doctrine

In State v. Lee,"4 a Washington court of appeals rejected the
defendant's contention that the stalking law was vague. The court held
that the term "follows" was not vague because it assumed that persons of
ordinary intelligence would interpret the term to include deliberately and
repeatedly traveling to a location in order to see and watch another
person." 5 This decision does not, however, end the inquiry as to whether
the Washington stalking law may be vague.
In City of Everett v. Moore,"6 a Washington court of appeals found a
general harassment statute to be both vague and overbroad. In discussing
the vagueness of the terms "annoyance" and "alarm," the court found
that this language did not properly warn citizens of conduct that was
criminalized under the ordinance." 7 The court invalidated the ordinance
because "[t]he people of Everett must not live in the continual fear that

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 542, 536 P.2d at 605.
Id. at 545, 536 P.2d at 607.
Id.
Wash. Rev. Code § 10.14.020(1) (1996) (referring to § 9A.46.11096)(b)).
82 Wash. App. 298, 917 P.2d 159 (1996).

115. Id. at 311, 917 P.2d at 166.
116. 37 Wash. App. 862, 683 P.2d 617 (1984).
117. Id. The ordinance prohibited "communicat[ion] with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by
telephone, mail or other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or
alarm." Id.at 863, 683 P.2d at 618.
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something they say to another might bother the listener to the point of
invoking the ordinance." '
4.

ConstitutionalInfirmities in the Washington Stalking Statute

The Washington stalking law may suffer two constitutional infirmities
arising from its definition of stalking behavior. Both relate to vagueness.
First, a court might find that the term "harasses" in the statute is
unconstitutionally vague." 9 Second, a court might hold that the law is
vague because the words "serve no legitimate or unlawful purpose" fall
to provide an ascertainable standard of behavior. 2
Washington law arguably fails to provide notice to a defendant, such
as a former spouse or lover,' concerning precisely which types of
conduct or avenues of communication will be considered harassment.
Furthermore, a defendant might claim that this statute invites arbitrary
enforcement because conviction depends heavily on the subjective
feelings experienced by the complainant.'
The statute specifically
precludes a defendant from raising a defense that he or she did not intend
to frighten, intimidate, or harass the other person by the attempted
communication or behavior.' Furthermore, even if a complaining party

did not notify an alleged stalker that his or her behavior was a cause of
anxiety for the victim, the stalker may not raise this lack of notice as a
defense.'24

118. Id. at 865, 683 P.2d at 618.
119. See M. Katherine Boychuk, Comment, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or
Overbroad? 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769, 796 (1994). The author notes that four different courts reached
four different conclusions when analyzing the language "alarms" or "annoys." The four results were
void for vagueness, void for overbreadth, not void for vagueness, and not void for overbreadth. The
Washington court reached the conclusion that the language in the Moore ordinance was both vague
and overbroad. Id.
120. See State v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221, 1224-25 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 900 P.2d
509 (Or. 1995). The court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the words
"serves no legitimate purpose" did not provide an ascertainable standard of conduct. The Oregon
Legislature amended the statute in June 1995, by eliminating the phrase. The new version of the law
was upheld by Multnomah County Circuit Judge Roosevelt Robinson. See Judge Upholds Oregon 's
New Stalking Law, Seattle Times, Nov. 5, 1995, at B3. But see Lee, 82 Wash. App. 298, 917 P.2d
159 (holding that phrase "without lawful authority" is not vague).
121. See Beck, supra note 18 (noting that stalking is most commonly reported by victims of
former spouses or lovers once relationship has been terminated by one person).
122. Wash. Rev. Code § 9AA6.110(1), (2) (1996).
123. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.110(2)(b) (1996).
124. § 9AA6.119(2)(a).
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Thus, a defendant to a stalking charge may argue that the law fails to
provide fair notice of what constitutes harassment "when measured by
common practice and understanding" of what behavior is acceptable.as
Fair notice may be especially difficult to ascertain in the context of
intimate relationships.' 26 A defendant may further argue that the law fails
to provide ascertainable standards for adjudication because it invites
arbitrary enforcement by law enforcement officers and judges who are
forced to rely on the subjective perceptions of the victim.'27
A second potential constitutional infirmity in the Washington statute
may lie in the phrase "serves no legitimate or lawful purpose," which is
similar to wording that was deemed vague in Oregon's stalking law. An
Oregon Court of Appeals decided that the phrase "without legitimate
purpose" in Oregon's stalking law was impermissibly vague.'28 The
Oregon statute provided that a stalking protective order could be issued if
the person, "'without legitimate purpose, intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the person or a
member of that person's immediate family." '29 The court held that the
phrase "without legitimate purpose" failed to sufficiently inform persons
of common intelligence of the conduct they must avoid. 30 Because the
statute implicated expressive activity, the court found the statute was
facially invalid rather than merely holding that the law was
unconstitutional as applied to the facts before the court.'
The Washington stalking law suffers from the same constitutional
infirmity that caused the Oregon stalking law to be struck down.
Washington's statute provides that a person commits stalking when he or
she engages in behavior "without lawful authority."' 32 This language is
strikingly similar to the terms "without legitimate purpose" that
invalidated the Oregon law.'33 Under Washington precedent, the word
125. See State v. Smith, 48 Wash. App. 33, 35, 737 P.2d 723, 724 (1987), aft'd, 111 Wash. 2d 1,
759 P.2d 372 (1988) (quoting State v. Carter, 89 Wash. 2d 236,239, 570 P.2d 1218 (1977)).
126. See Beck, supranote 18.
127. See id. Although the statute requires that a reasonable person must have experienced fear in
the same situation, the arrest and conviction of a stalker will depend heavily on whether the person
bringing the charge can demonstrate that he or she subjectively felt fear as a result of the other
person's actions.
128. State v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied,900 P.2d 509 (1995).
129. Id. at 1222.

130. Id. at 1224.
131. Id, at 1224 n.1.
132. Wash. Rev. Code § 10. 14.020(1) (1996).
133. Norris-Romine,894 P.2d at 1222.
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"lawful" is not inherently vague. 134 However, the statutory term "lawful"
will be considered unconstitutionally vague if there are no "readily
ascertainable sources of law" to illuminate the meaning in the context of
the particular statute. 35 Thus, a Washington court may determine that an
ordinary citizen is not adequately informed as to what constitutes
prohibited conduct under the stalking law. 136 Because the term "harasses"
may not be defined precisely enough, as discussed above, the
Washington law arguably does not provide ascertainable standards in the
current language of the statute.
5.

Remediesfor Vagueness in a Stalking Law

The drafters of other state stalking laws devised three ways to remedy
the vagueness inherent in the terms such as "harasses" or "annoys" used
to describe stalking behavior. 37 First, many statutes require the
communication of a credible threat in addition to harassing behavior. 3 '
Second, most stalking laws exempt constitutionally protected activity
from the scope of the statute.'3 9 Third, many statutes include an objective
134. See State v. Lee, 82 Wash. App. 298, 310, 917 P.2d 159, 166 (1996); State v. Carver, 113
Wash. 2d 591,599, 781 P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (1989).
135. State v. Smith, 111 Wash. 2d 1, 11, 759 P.2d 372, 377 (1988).
136. See Carver, 113 Wash. 2d at 599-600, 781 P.2d at 1312-13. But see Lee, 82 Wash. App. at
310, 917 P.2d at 166.
137. State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212,217 (Kan. 1996) (citing Boychuk supra nota 119, at 788-89).
138. Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-9 to -94 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie Supp. 1995)
(requiring a "terroristic threat"); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); Iowa
Code Ann. § 708.11 (West Supp. 1996); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 508.130-.150 (1995); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3A-1 to -4 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1996); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-1700 to -1840 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 42.071 (West Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1995 & Supp. 1996); W. Va. Code
§ 61-2-9a (1992 & Supp. 1996).
139. Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie Supp. 1995); Cal.
Penal Code § 646.9 (West Supp. 1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312A (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 784.048 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-90 to -93 (Michie 1996). Idaho Code § 187905 (Supp. 1996); Ind. Code Ann. ch. 35-45-10 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); Kan. Stat. Ann § 213438 (West Supp. 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 750.41 lh-.41 Ii (West Supp. 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (West Supp. 1997); Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1996); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.225 (West Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 455-220 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 200.571-.601 (Michie 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3a
(1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 12-10 (West 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1995);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709 (West. Supp.
1996); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-1700 to 1840 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19A-1 to -7 (Michie Supp. 1996);
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.071 (West Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1995 & Supp.
1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1061-1063 (Supp. 1996); W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a (1992 & Supp.
1996); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1996).
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standard by requiring that the harassing behavior be severe enough to
cause a "reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress."'40
These three remedies mitigate against the probability that a statute will
be found inherently vague. The inclusion of each provision helps provide
notice to an ordinary citizen of what conduct is specifically proscribed
and further, delineates ascertainable standards that decrease the
opportunity for arbitrary enforcement of the law.' The Washington
stalking law fails to include two of the three remedies. It does not contain
"credible threat" language'42 and, furthermore, fails to include an
exemption for constitutionally protected activities. 43
a.

FirstRemedy: Includinga Credible ThreatRequirement

The Washington law would be better protected from an attack of
vagueness if it included a credible threat requirement as does the
California stalking statute.'" The California law requires proof of three
elements. First, an offender must willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follow or harass another person; second, the offender must make a
credible threat; and, third, the offender must intend to place the other
person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury. 4 ' An appellate
court upheld the California stalking law against a vagueness challenge,
holding that the term "credible threat" did not require an intent to kill or

140. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.1 10(1)(b); see also Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (1994); Cal.
Penal Code § 646.9 (West Supp. 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 (West 1990 & Supp.
1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312A (1995); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7905 (Supp. 1996); Ind. Code
Ann. ch. 35-45-10 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. § 708.11 (West. Supp. 1996); Kan.
Stat. Ann § 21-3438 (%Vest Supp. 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1997); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.41 lh-.41 li;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.749 (West Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1996); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 565.225 (West Supp. 1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 200.571-.601 (Michie 1995); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 633:3a (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-10 (West 1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-1
to -4 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1997); I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 16-3-1700 to -1840 (Supp. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1996); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1996).
141. See State v. Carver, 48 Wash. App. 33, 35, 737 P.2d 723, 724 (1987), ajrd,111 Wash. 2d 1,
759 P.2d 372 (1988).
142. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 646.9.
143. § 646.9.
144. § 646.9.
145. § 646.9.
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cause great bodily harms, but only an intent to46threaten another person so
as to make that person reasonably frightened.
The inclusion of the credible requirement better defines what kind of
harassing behavior is prohibited. 4 7 Additionally, adoption of this remedy
protects against an overbreadth challenge because the communication of
a credible threat is not protected speech. 48 The current language of the
Washington statute fails to require that an actual threat be
communicated; rather, the language is broader. The Washington law
requires only that a stalker "harasses" or "repeatedly follows" another,
and that the victim reasonably experience fear. 14 9 A credible threat
requirement defines the proscribed behavior more precisely and narrows
the application of the statute to circumstances in which a threat is
communicated. Thus, the inclusion of a credible threat requirement in the
Washington statute would improve the likelihood that it will be upheld
against an attack for vagueness or overbreadth s
b.

Second Remedy: Inclusion of an Exemption for Constitutionally
ProtectedActivities

The addition of a provision exempting activities protected by the First
Amendment would also repel a challenge for vagueness. Although a
court ultimately must decide what behavior is protected, an exemption
specifically removes any constitutionally protected conduct from the
scope of the statute.' A reviewing court is clearly put on notice that the
scope of the statute is narrowed to include only behavior that is not
protected by the First Amendment. Thus, a court may decide that a
particular case before it falls within the reach of the exemption. The
exemption saves the statute from being struck down as unconstitutional
as the court may hold that the law is merely inapplicable to a specific
case in which protected activities are implicated.

146. People v. Carron, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 333 (Ct. App. 1995).
147. See Boychuk, supra note 119, at 787.
148. Id. at 788-89.
149. See supra note 70.
150. See, e.g., Boychuk, supranote 119, at 799 (noting requirement that threat be communicated
mitigates against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because law enforcement officer cannot
make arrest based on his or her subjective determination of what constitutes "harassing" or
"following" behavior in particular situation).
151. Id.

Constitutionality of the Washington Stalking Law
c.

The Washington Statute CurrentlyProvides the ThirdRemedy:
Inclusion of an Objective Standard

The third remedy for vagueness is the inclusion of an objective
standard in the definition of the harassing conduct. In State v. Bryan, 52
the Kansas Supreme Court struck down the state stalking law because the
statute provided no guidelines to determine when "following" becomes
alarming, annoying, or harassing. The statute failed to include an
objective standard by which to judge the conduct of one charged with the
crime of stalking.'5 3 The court found that although stalking is a specific
intent crime, the intent element did not ameliorate its vagueness. 54 The
statute required only an intentional following, but did not require an
intent to alarm, annoy, or harass a victim.'55 According to the court, the
law failed to provide an adequate standard
of conduct by which ordinary
15 6
citizens could judge their conduct.
The Washington law, however, does provide an objective standard by
which to measure the conduct of a stalker. The harassing behavior is
measured by whether it causes a feeling of fear "that a reasonable person
in the same situation would experience under all the circumstances."' 57
Thus, the Washington law includes an objective standard that somewhat
ameliorates a problem of vagueness. 58 Because the statute fails to require
a credible threat or include an exemption for constitutionally protected
activities, however, the objective standard may be insufficient to allow
the Washington law to withstand a constitutional challenge that it is
impermissibly vague.
B.

OverbreadthDoctrine

As noted above, vagueness and overbreadth challenges are
intertwined.' 9 Overbreadth challenges, however, apply only to statutes
152. State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212, 214-15 (Kan. 1996). The court in Bryan considered the
language of the statute prior to the 1992 amendments.
153. Id. at217.
154. Id at221.
155. Id. at 220.

156. Id.
157. Wash. Rev. Code § 9AA6.110(1)(b) (1996).

158. See Boychuk, supra note 119, at 789 n.115. The author notes that the reasonable person
standard "is not a panacea for the fickleness of judges and juries. It does, however, distance
application of the stalking laws from the subjective state of mind of the victim."
159. See Wickens, supra note 11, at 193.
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that inhibit First Amendment rights-the freedoms of speech and
expression-although any statute may be struck down as vague. An
overbroad statute is one designed to prohibit behavior or activities that
that includes within its scope
are not constitutionally protected, but
16
activities protected by the Constitution. 1
1.

U.S. Supreme Court'sApplication of the OverbreadthDoctrine

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial. 16' A court must examine a statute's
"plainly legitimate sweep" in relation to the degree of constitutionally
protected behavior that is within the scope of the law.'62
The Court addressed content-based speech restrictions in R.A. V v.
City of St. Paul,63 and held that a statute that restricts protected speech,
no matter how objectionable, is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court
held in R.A. V that even proscribable speech such as "fighting words"
may not be regulated based on their content."
2.

Washington Supreme Court'sApplication of the Overbreadth
Doctrine

The Washington Supreme Court relied on R.A. V to partially
invalidate the Washington "hate crimes statute" insofar as it regulated
constitutionally protected speech rather than conduct. 6 The court held
that although certain well-defined categories of speech, such as
obscenity, defamation, and fighting words, are "low value speech," a
finding that speech has low First Amendment value does not mean that it
is wholly without constitutional protection. 66 Racial harassment
prosecuted under the Washington hate crimes statute was "odious
behavior," but it fell within the realm of constitutionally protected

160. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-16 (1971).
161. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).

162. Id.
163. 507 U.S. 377 (1992).
164. Id. "Fighting words" are "words... which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (White, J., concurring)).
165. State v. Talley, 122 Wash. 2d 192, 216, 858 P.2d 217, 230 (1993).
166. Id. at 217, 858 P.2d at 23 1.
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speech. 67 The court held, therefore, that the part of the statute that

regulated speech based on content was unconstitutionally overbroad.
The court, applying the same principles to a challenge to the
Washington stalking law, must determine whether the statute regulates
only conduct or whether it regulates speech and conduct. t If the court
finds that the law specifically regulates conduct and only incidentally
touches speech, the statute will be held constitutional.'69 If the court,
however, determines that the statute unduly restricts an individual's right
of expression, in addition to regulating his or her conduct, the statute will
be struck down as an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment
170

rights.

Because of the context in which most documented stalking cases arise,
defendants may face a charge of stalking for an effort at communication
that they did not intend to be threatening to the other person.'17 Although
the communication of a threat is not constitutionally protected speech, 72
other forms of speech are proscribed by this statute. For example, at the
end of a relationship, one person may contact the former partner in an
effort to re-establish the relationship. If the complaining party gives an
alleged stalker actual notice that he or she does not want to be contacted,
any indication that the stalker has attempted contact will constitute prima
facie evidence that the stalker has intentionally intimidated or harassed
the other person."7 3 Thus, a defendant to an allegation of stalking may be
167. Id. at 218, 858 P.2d at 231. Mr. Talley's action of burning a cross on his own lawn to
intimidate a racially-mixed couple who were considering purchasing the home next door could not
be prosecuted under the statute as the law was overbroad in proscribing his constitutionally protected
symbolic speech. The actions of two boys, in a lawsuit consolidated with Mr. Talley's, were
arguably criminal under the portion of the statute which regulated only conduct and which was
upheld. The boys burned a cross on the law of an African-American rather than on their own lawn.
The claim against the boys was remanded for farther proceedings, whereas the lawsuit against Mr.
Talley was dismissed. Id.
168. See State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993). The Connecticut court upheld its
stalking law, in part because the word "harass" had been removed from an early version of the
statute. Thus, the court determined that its statute, without the term "harass," did not implicate
speech, but rather criminalized conduct only.
169. Seattle v. Huff, I1I Wash. 2d 923, 767 P.2d 572 (1989) (upholding telephone harassment
statute); State v. Smith, 48 Wash. App. 33, 35, 737 P.2d 723, 724 (1987), afd, 111 Wash. 2d 1, 759
P.2d 372 (1988) (upholding harassment statute); Seattle v. Camby, 104 Wash. 2d 49, 701 P.2d 499
(1985) (upholding malicious harassment statute).
170. See City of Everett v. Moore, 37 Wash. App. 862, 683 P.2d 617 (1984).
171. See Beck, supra note 18.
172. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 507 U.S. 377 (1992).
173. Wash. Rev. Code § 9AA6.110 (4) (1996) ("Attempts to contact or follow the person after
being given actual notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed constitutes prima
facie evidence that the stalker intends to intimidate or harass the person.").
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restricted in his or her ability to express opinions. The defendant's
speech may be unconstitutionally regulated by this statute, causing a
chilling effect on free speech in violation of the First Amendment.
3.

Washington Court ofAppeals 'Application of the Overbreadth
Doctrine

A Washington court of appeals held that the stalking statute is not
overbroad because it is "plainly" aimed at regulating conduct rather than
speech. 74 The court acknowledged that a person could "provoke a
reasonable but mistaken sense of fear" in another person.' 75 The court,
however, concluded that overbreadth challenges should be addressed on
basis and declined to prospectively invalidate the
a case-by-case
76
statute. 1
A Washington court of appeals found a harassmen . statute that is
similar to the stalking law to be overbroad as well as vague. 7 7 In City of
Everett v. Moore, the court struck down its ordinance because the words
"alarms or seriously annoys" could be applied to constitutionally
protected speech. 17 The court held that discourse concerning "any
political, social, economic, philosophic or religious topic" might alarm or
annoy a listener, but that discussion may be protected by the First
Amendment. 79 Thus, the ordinance at issue could have been applied to
proscribe constitutionally protected speech because o- the particular
sensibilities of the complainant. 8 0
In addition to finding that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague,
the court also held that it was overbroad.' It was vague because the
terms used to describe prohibited conduct did not provide notice to an
ordinary citizen and because the terms were subject to a wide range of

174. State v. Lee, 82 Wash. App. 298, 307, 917 P.2d 159, 165 (1996).
175. Id. at 309, 917 P.2d at 166.
176. Id. at 309-10, 917 P.2d at 166.
177. City of Everett v. Moore, 37 Wash. App. 862, 683 P.2d 617 (1984).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 64, 683 P.2d at 618. The court, addressing the alarm aspect stated, "the public is
constantly being put on alert about the disastrous effects of everything from vitamin deficiencies in
the blood to nuclear obliteration .... And such alarms are often legitimate."
180. Id. at 864-65, 683 P.2d at 618-19. Conviction under the Washington stalking law does
depend on the subjective feelings of a victim, but the drafters of the law ircluded a "reasonable
person standard" in the language of the statute. This provides an objective standard that the
ordinance at issue in Moore did not contain.
181. See supratext accompanying notes 116-118.
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meanings depending on the sensibilities of the complainant. 8 2 Further,
the ordinance was overbroad because protected speech and conduct were
proscribed in the same manner as unprotected speech and conduct. 3 The
stalking law arguably suffers from the same defect as the ordinance at
issue in Moore because the plainly legitimate sweep of the statute
extends to protected speech and conduct as well as implicating
unprotected behavior."S
The two remedies for vagueness that the Washington law is lacking
could shield against an attack for overbreadth. First, the inclusion of a
credible threat requirement would narrow the scope of activities within
the reach of the statute because the proscribed behavior would more
closely resemble the elements of criminal assault. Such behavior would
be unlikely to fall in the realm of protected behavior. Second, an
exemption for constitutionally protected activities would mitigate against
overbreadth because any behavior that implicates constitutional
protection would be excluded from conviction under the stalking law.
V.

CONCLUSION: SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO THE
WASHINGTON LAW

Although most state laws criminalizing stalking have been upheld
against constitutional challenges, courts have examined the particular
statutory language carefully to determine whether it is narrowly drafted
to provide a citizen with ascertainable standards of conduct and to
determine whether it proscribes only activity that is not constitutionally
protected.
The Washington stalking law will likely withstand constitutional
attack if it is amended to include two provisions that mitigate against
challenges claiming vagueness and overbreadth. First, the Legislature
should amend the law to include the requirement of a credible threat to
ameliorate vagueness in the definition of "harasses" in the statute.
Second, the Legislature should add a provision exempting
constitutionally protected activities, such as lobbying and picketing. The
efficacy of this law in addressing the serious danger inherent in stalking
will ultimately turn on whether the law is upheld when its
182. Moore, 37 Wash. App. at 864, 683 P.2d at 618-20.
183. Id.
184. See State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993). The court held that the stalking
statute did not reach protected speech, but rather only unprotected conduct. The court found it
persuasive that the Connecticut legislature deleted the word "harasses" from its statute, thereby
eliminating the possibility that the statute would regulate protected speech.
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constitutionality is challenged. By providing a remedy to the current
constitutional infirmities, the Washington Legislature can ensure that the
law stands and achieves its intended purpose of protecting victims of
stalking.

